

2024 LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS –

**OBSERVATION
MISSION REPORT**

February 2025

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2024

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAFP	Alliance for African Farmers Party
ACT-Wazalendo	Alliance for Change and Transparency
ADA TADEA	African Democratic Alliance Party
ADC	Alliance for Democratic Change
ARO	Assistant Returning Officer
BVR	Barometric Voter Registration
CCK	Chama cha Kijamii
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CHAUMA	Chama cha Ukombozi wa Umma
CUF	Civic United Front
DC	District Commissioner
GN	Government Notice
INEC	Independent National Election Commission
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Center
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MoU	Memorandums of Understanding
NCCR—Mageuzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organization
NLD	National League for Democracy
NRA	National Reconstruction Alliance
PO-RALG	President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government
PWDs	Persons with Disability
RC	Regional Commissioner



RO	Returning Officer
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAU	Sauti ya Umma
TCRA	Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
UDP	United Democratic Party
UMD	Union for Multiparty Democracy
UPDP	United Peoples' Democratic Party



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), a prominent non-governmental organization in Tanzania, remains at the forefront of promoting human rights, democracy, and good governance in the country. The Centre recognizes the critical role of citizen participation as way of strengthening democratic governance in Tanzania. Moreover, LHRC is recognized for active interventions in the Tanzania electoral processes local government and/or general elections providing voter education and/or conducting election observation.

The President's Office, Regional Administration, and Local Government (PO-RALG) accredited LHRC to engage in the November 2024 Local Government Elections provide voter education and conduct election observation. LHRC was aware of the importance of providing voter education and conducting election observation as crucial interventions to enhance citizen awareness and participation, which affect overall integrity of electoral process.

Voter education

Voter education is a vital pre-election information that ensures citizens are well-informed and knowledgeable about their electoral power and mandate defined as rights and duties of voting to elect elective public officials in a democratic society. LHRC designed and implemented comprehensive voter education program addressing apparent gaps regarding election timing and qualifying procedures – official announcement, voter registration, candidates' nomination, appeals campaigning, voting, vote counting, declaration of winners/results and petitioning.

Voter education focused on, among others, raising awareness about the importance of local government elections by highlighting the role and functions of local leaders in governance, development, and delivery of entitlements. The program also addressed misconceptions and barriers to participation by combatting misinformation, electoral apathy, and obstacles such as lack of identification documents, voter intimidation, and challenges to the polling stations' visibility.



Election observation

LHRC conducted election observation aimed at promoting electoral integrity and public trust in electoral process and its outcome. LHRC undertook a robust election observation mission in fifteen regions across Tanzania Mainland, namely Kagera, Njombe, Singida, Geita, Simiyu, Lindi, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mbeya, Katavi, Iringa, Mara, Ruvuma, Manyara, and Songwe. LHRC election observation mission activities involved training and deployment of accredited election observers to follow up and monitor electoral processes on a continuous basis. The election observers followed up, recorded and reported on pre-election behaviors and preparations, party/candidates' nominations, campaigning, election day operations (voting, vote counting and declaration of results) and post-election responses.

The primary objective of the election observation mission was to assess and report about electoral issues staking on credibility and fairness of the electoral process and outcome, and feedback on election management compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks. The election observers focused on the key areas of the electoral process, namely pre-election phase, assessing voter registration, supply/availability of electoral materials, the preparedness of electoral officials, and voter education awareness. Observers monitored campaign activities assessing conduct of political campaigns, adherence to laws governing campaign financing, the use of public resources, and the prevalence of hate speech or intimidation. On election day, observers evaluated the opening of polling stations, voter turnout, the conduct of polling officials, the secrecy and security of the ballot, the transparency of vote counting, and the announcement of results. Finally, post-election developments such as acceptance of results, resolution of electoral disputes, and public perceptions of the process were closely tracked to assess and determine election integrity.

Challenges and opportunities

While the observation mission was largely successful, several challenges were encountered too –hindering smooth flow of observation activities. Delays in obtaining critical electoral information such as polling station maps and campaign schedules posed logistical challenges for observers. Similarly, some administrative gaps, such as reluctance of Returning Officers (ROs) to introduce observers to Assistant Returning Officers (AROs), compromised observer timely access to polling stations in some areas.

This seven chapters' report provides a comprehensive account of LHRC's voter education and election observation program activities undertaken for the November 2024 Local Government Elections.



Legal and regulatory framework

The legal and regulatory framework governing Tanzania Local Government Elections is such that the elections are recognized by the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977). The laws and regulations defining the framework include the Independent National Electoral Commission Act No. 2 (2024), the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (Chapter 287), the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (Chapter 288), the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) Act, 2009, and the local government election regulations 2024 published in the Gazette as Government notice numbers 571, 572, 573 and 574 of 12th July 2024. Section 10(1)(c) of the Independent National Electoral Commission Act mandates INEC to coordinate and supervise the local government elections subject to a law enacted by Parliament divulging nitty-gritty of INEC the said mandate.

The Local Government (District Authorities) Act Cap 287 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act Cap 288 as amended in 2009 to provide for the establishment of local authorities at local level villages, hamlets, wards, divisions and district authorities in the rural settings of political administration, and the urban authorities namely, neighborhoods, wards, divisions, and urban authorities town, municipal and city councils, respectively are key to local government elections. The 2009 amendments [sections: 87A and 201A of respective Acts] imply mandating the minister responsible for local government to make regulations guiding smooth conduct and management of elections in the district and urban authorities. Pursuant to the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) Act, 2009 the minister responsible for local government on August 12th promulgated the Local Government Regulations for the Election of the village chairperson, members of the village council and hamlet chairperson in district authorities GN, No. 571; the Local Government Regulations for the Election of the hamlet chairperson in township authorities GN, No. 572 2024; the Local Government Regulations for the Election of the village chairperson, members of the village governing councils and hamlet chairpersons in Urban Authorities GN, No. 573; and the Local Government Regulations for the Election for the Election of the hamlet chairpersons and members of neighborhoods governing committees in urban authorities, GN, No. 574.

Methodology for conducting voter education

Voter education conducted for local government elections relied on the mainstream and social media alike, because according to Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, Tanzania has 31 million people actively engaging in the social media – Facebook, X, Instagram and many others. LHRC leveraged such magnificent social media active presence and visibility of the population to launch voter education campaigns, especially through



Facebook, X and Instagram platforms. Posters and jingles were created and disseminated through social media platforms and LHRC website.

The voter education campaign messages covered key practical topics, including:

- Eligibility criteria of voters.
- Locations designated for voter registration.
- Candidate eligibility criteria.
- Available mechanisms and approaches for resolving election-related disputes.
- Election timetable indicating deadlines/dates for voter registration, campaigns and polling.
- The voting process.
- The roles of stakeholders in the local government election process.

Moreover, LHRC disseminated voter education messages through twenty six (26) partner community radio, national radio and television (*Kipimajoto* and *Meza Huru, Mizani ya Wiki, clouds 360 and Upendo TV*) stations broadcasts. It is estimated that community radio and TV messages directly reached over 15 million voters. The national radio stations that aired voter education were Crown Radio, Clouds Radio, East African Radio, Dodoma FM Radio, AFM Dodoma Radio, Njombe FM, Radio One, and international broadcasters such as DW Radio, BBC Radio, and VOA Radio. Online discussion platforms powered by Jamii forums, Jambo online TV and The Chanzo disseminated voter education messages to high profile audience.

Press conferences and exclusive interviews augmented voter education messages to a wider electorate.

Methodology for conducting election observation

LHRC recruited, trained and deployed election observation missions in fifteen (15) regions, namely Kagera, Njombe, Singida, Geita, Simiyu, Lindi, Mtwara, Morogoro, Mbeya, Katavi, Iringa, Mara, Ruvuma, Manyara, and Songwe. The election observer mission observed, identified, and documented several electoral process issues, including irregularities. Chiefly elections observers documented electoral issues, including but not limited to the following:

- Registration of ineligible voters; allegedly under 18 years



- Registration stations being designated in the CCM cadres' residences
- Voters registered at multiple Registration Stations
- Political parties' debility to deploy voter registration agents
- Registration of Voters in Absentia
- Registration Officers Operating Outside Designated Stations
- Low level of Civic Competence and Voter Education
- The Departed Listed as Valid Voters
- Suspicious Death of Opposition Candidate
- Few Women and Persons with Disability Made it to Elective Offices
- Forgeries; Appointment of Candidates Not Contesting Elective Positions

Election campaign

The election campaigns took seven days (one week) 20th to 26th November 2024 – as spelt out in the Local Government Election 2024 Regulations. Campaigns took place across the country contestants for village chairs, hamlet chairs, village governing council membership in the district councils/authorities; and neighborhoods chairs and governing committee members in the urban authorities; and hamlet chairs competitive positions in the township authorities divulged political campaign messages. LHRC observers noted, documented and reported on the key campaign issues as bulleted hereunder:

- Adherence to Election Campaign Program
- Alleged Unlawful Arrest of Opposition Officials
- Absence of Security Agency
- Involvement of children in election campaign

Voting and declaration of results

The election campaign lasted for seven days, immediately followed by election day, 27th November 2024, pursuant to election regulations. On the election day and after the observers took note and reported on a number of issues, including but not limited to;



- Ballot Papers Exceeding the Total Number of Registered Voters
- Prior Marked/Fake Ballot Papers
- Denial of Polling Agents Access to Polling Stations
- Absence of Candidates' Photographs on the Ballot Papers
- Suspicious Deaths and Enforced Disappearances of Candidates
- Questionable Recognition and Cold Treatment of Election Observers
- Intrusion of Government Officials into Management of Election
- Unguaranteed Right to Secrecy of Casting Vote
- Allegations of Involving Underage Voters
- Consideration of people with special needs
- Suspension of pupils on allegations of parents supporting the opposition

Declaration of election results

The incumbent CCM was declared the overall countrywide election winner amassing 99.01% of village chairs (available slots: 12271); 98.83% of neighborhoods chairs (available slots: 4264); 98.26% of hamlet chairs (available slots: 63849); 99% of village governing council members; and 99.30% of neighborhood committee members. The main opposition, CHADEMA made a distant second position with less than 1% overall.

Conclusion and recommendations

Tanzania local government elections experience the gap of lacking finite and coordinated legal framework, which certainly affected management of the 2024 elections. Neither do the electoral support instruments and mechanisms to facilitate stakeholders exist for media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) independently provide voter education and/or conduct election observation; formalized and existing as reliable system rather than service providers relying on discretionary powers of local government officials. A partnership role and cooperation principles compact is loudly recommended.



Recommendations

The recommendations crafted and resonating with substantive issues covered and documented in the preceding chapters are as narrated hereunder:

- i. A coordinated legal framework be established whereby procedures for conducting the local government election swiveled well with election stakeholders support instruments is clearly outlined.
- ii. Registration of local government elections be merged with that of the INEC where the registration shall be biometric as opposed to the current situation where the registration process is symbolically an *ad-hoc* exercise.
- iii. A legislation mandating INEC to coordinate and supervise local government elections as per section 10(c)(1) of the INEC Act be enacted.
- iv. A clear post-election dispute settlement mechanism is established as opposed to the current system which seems to have a number of challenges as enshrined in the regulation
- v. Introduce the election management governance system whereby government officials should phase out from directly supervising and coordinating local government elections, but the latter is managed by an independent election management body.
- vi. Establish a portal whereby NGOs applying for accreditation to provide voter education or conduct election observation shall lodge applications unlike the current arrangement whereby discretionary powers of government officials prevail.
- vii. The application for and accreditation process of NGOs desirous to provide voter education or conduct election observation must be thoroughly transparent.
- viii. Extend the period for providing voter education to 30 days before the election.
- ix. Afford an opportunity to stakeholders aggrieved by the decision of the permanent secretary to grant accreditation to appeal.
- x. Grounds for disqualification of candidates should be only limited to constitutional requirements.



- xi. Polling agents to be a mandatory requirement both in voting and counting results.
Failure to deploy polling agents to invalidate the electoral process
- xii. Accreditation of election observers to be granted according to the wishes of the applicant and not the authority issuing the accreditation
- xiii. Polling agents to take oath to any commissioner of oath not mandatorily necessary to the returning officer or a magistrate



CHAPTER ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), a non-governmental organization in Tanzania, remains at the forefront of promoting human rights, democracy, and good governance in the country. The Centre recognizes the critical role of citizen participation as way of strengthening democratic governance in Tanzania. Moreover, LHRC is recognized for active interventions in the Tanzania electoral processes local government and/or general elections alike – providing **voter education** and/or conducting **election observation**. These interventions essentially create opportunistic entry point for independent citizens’ groups to engage in elections. Involvement of independent citizens’ groups in elections ensure ownership and restore election integrity by way of scrutinizing election results and the process thereto. To that end, during the 2024 local government elections, LHRC filled the void of independent citizens’ groups self-assigned to promote democratic virtues of electoral transparency, accountability and citizens’ participation. The said virtues provide vital leverage for assessing and certifying electoral verdict certifying elections as free, fair, trusted and credible or not. LHRC intervention followed government official announcement of 12th July 2024 informing the public and political parties of local government elections in Tanzania Mainland villages (12,318), neighborhoods (4,263) and hamlets (64,361) in the Local Government Authorities (184). the Minister of State, President’s Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) published in the Gazette, Government notice numbers 571, 572, 573 and 574 signifying regulations for conducting the 2024 neighborhoods/civic elections consistent with Chapter 287 and Chapter 288 of the laws of Tanzania. According to the Political Parties Act (Chapter 258 [R.E 2019]), contesting political elective positions is a monopoly bestowed to political parties only. Tanzania has 19 fully registered political parties, hence legally mandated to participate in the state elections.

As way of qualifying to engage in the **November 2024 Local Government Elections**, LHRC was officially accredited by the **President’s Office, Regional Administration, and Local Government (PO-RALG)** to carry out two mandates: providing voter education to empower citizens with the necessary knowledge and skills to meaningfully participate in the electoral process, and conduct election observation to assess and the electoral process consistent with the prevailing electoral laws and regulations. LHRC would always peep a comparative eye with relevant provisions in the regional or international protocols, codes and standards.

The local government elections are important in that they provide a platform for citizens to elect grassroots level leadership, which is closer to community day-to-day life and



aspirations. The Local Government Authorities (LGAs) play the central role in delivering services to people, overseeing governance practices at local level and implementation of development policies. This role make the local government elections a critical aspect of local level participatory democracy. To that end, LHRC was aware of the importance of providing voter education and conducting election observation as crucial interventions to enhance citizen awareness and participation, which affect overall integrity of electoral process.

1.1 Voter Education

Voter education is a vital pre-election information that ensures citizens are well-informed and knowledgeable about their electoral power and mandate defined as rights and duties of voting to elect elective public officials in a democratic society. LHRC designed and implemented comprehensive voter education program addressing apparent gaps regarding election timing and qualifying procedures – official announcement, voter registration, candidates nomination, appeals campaigning, voting, vote counting, declaration of winners/results and petitioning. Voter education focused on facilitating relevant information to electorate about their voting rights and responsibilities, emphasizing the importance of universal suffrage voting as way of consolidating democracy in the country. The program content also specifically clarified the electoral process by providing timely information on the obtaining election procedures; voter registration, party and candidate nominations, campaigns, voting day protocols, and the role of election officials.

Further, LHRC raised awareness about the importance of local government elections by highlighting the role and functions of local leaders in governance, development, and delivery of entitlements. The program also addressed misconceptions and barriers to participation by combatting misinformation, electoral apathy, and obstacles such as lack of identification documents, voter intimidation, and challenges to the polling stations' visibility. LHRC adopted a multi-faceted approach to deliver voter education, including face-to-face community sensitization forums, radio and television programs, printed materials such as posters, leaflets, and brochures, and the use of social media to reach diverse audience, particularly the special groups of women, youth, and persons with disabilities.



1.2 Election Observation

Election observation is an internationally recognized practice aimed at promoting electoral integrity and public trust in electoral process and its outcome. By independently monitoring elections, observers play a crucial role in identifying strengths, weaknesses, and areas of improvement in the conduct of elections. For the November 2024 Local Government Elections, LHRC undertook a robust election observation mission in fifteen regions across Tanzania Mainland, namely Kagera, Njombe, Singida, Geita, Simiyu, Lindi, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mbeya, Katavi, Iringa, Mara, Ruvuma, Manyara, and Songwe. LHRC election observation mission activities involved training and deployment of accredited election observers to follow up and monitor electoral process on a continuous basis. The election observers followed up, recorded and reported on pre-election behaviors and preparations, party/candidates nominations, campaigning, election day operations (voting, vote counting and declaration of results) and post-election responses.

The primary objective of election observation mission was to assess and report about electoral issues staking on credibility and fairness of the electoral process and outcome, and feedback on election management compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks. The latter is defined by a combination of national laws and regulations, regional electoral codes and protocols and the international electoral democracy codes and standards. Tanzania is a signatory and ratified the Guidelines for EAC Election Observation Missions and Code of Conduct for Election Observers; the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; the Africa Union Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa; and the International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights among others. Election observation aimed at assessing process compliance with prevailing standards and promoting electoral transparency and accountability that would in turn enhance public confidence in elections and the outcome. LHRC assumed the role of an independent and impartial body; an operating system documenting irregularities, challenges and shortcomings, and feeding back to the election management body during specific election cycle cord. Electoral misconduct, voter suppression, administrative lapses, or logistical challenges would be recorded, documented and communicated to the PO-RALG. Furthermore, LHRC sought and provided evidence-based recommendations for electoral reforms to improve future processes and strengthen electoral democracy in the country.



During observation mission, LHRC observers focused on the key areas of the electoral process, namely pre-election phase, assessing voter registration, supply/availability of electoral materials, the preparedness of electoral officials, and voter education awareness. Observers monitored campaign activities assessing conduct of political campaigns, adherence to laws governing campaign financing, the use of public resources, and the prevalence of hate speech or intimidation. On election day, observers evaluated the opening of polling stations, voter turnout, the conduct of polling officials, the secrecy and security of the ballot, the transparency of vote counting, and the announcement of results. Finally, post-election developments such as acceptance of results, resolution of electoral disputes, and public perceptions of the process were closely tracked to assess and determine election integrity.

The observation process was guided by international best practices, including principles enshrined in instruments such as the **Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation** and the **SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections**. Observers were equipped with checklists and tools to ensure systematic and uniform data collection across the selected regions.

1.3 Challenges and Opportunities

While the observation mission was largely successful, LHRC encountered several challenges that hindered smooth flow of observation activities. Delays in obtaining critical electoral information such as polling station maps and campaign schedules posed logistical challenges for observers. Similarly, some administrative gaps, such as reluctance of Returning Officers (ROs) to introduce observers to Assistant Returning Officers (AROs), compromised observers' timely access to polling stations in some areas.

Despite challenges, the observation mission availed LHRC with the opportunity to strengthen collaboration with electoral stakeholders and advocate for reforms enhancing election integrity for future elections.

1.4 Conclusion

This report provides a comprehensive account of LHRC's voter education and election observation program activities undertaken for the November 2024 Local Government Elections. It documents key achievements, challenges, lessons learned, and recommendations aimed at improving Tanzania electoral processes. LHRC remains



committed to promoting free, fair, and credible elections, which is fundamental for consolidating good democratic governance, sustained by active electorate and empowered citizenry.



CHAPTER TWO

II. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the legal and regulatory framework governing Tanzania Local Government Elections. First and foremost, the Local Government elections are regulated by the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977). The other laws and regulations defining the framework include the Independent National Electoral Commission Act No. 2 (2024), the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (Chapter 287), the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (Chapter 288), the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) Act, 2009, and the local government election regulations 2024 published in the Gazette as Government notice numbers 571, 572, 573 and 574 of 12th July 2024.

2.1.1 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977

The articles 145 and 146 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania embed the essence and significance of local government authorities stating the core mandate, role and principles. The Constitution spells out undisputable role of local government in the country, correctly interpreted as intermediary agency charged with entrenching democracy in society, consolidating culture of good democratic governance and self-regulation of the people at the grassroots level. Tanzania local government authorities are therefore recognized as constitutional establishment bridging lower and higher government levels.

2.1.2 The Independent National Electoral Commission Act No. 2 of 2024

The Independent National Electoral Commission is a constitutionally mandated institution established to oversee coordination of elections in Tanzania. Section 10(1)(c) of the Act gives INEC the mandate to coordinate and supervise the local government elections subject to a law enacted by Parliament divulging nitty-gritty of INEC mandate to the effect. The parliament has however, so far not yet enacted such enabling law to guide oversight and coordination of local government elections.



2.1.3 The Local Government (District Authorities) Act Cap 287 as amended in 2009

This is an act of parliament enacted in 1982 to provide for the establishment of local authorities at local level – villages, hamlets, wards, divisions and district authorities – in the rural settings of political administration. The 2009 amendment [section 87A of the Act] imply mandating the minister responsible for local government to make regulations guiding smooth conduct and management of elections in district authorities. The elections of village chairpersons, hamlets chairpersons and members of the village governing councils in the district authorities are steered by section 87A of the Act. To that end, the Act is central to conducting local government elections in the district authorities.

2.1.4 The Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act Cap 288 as amended in 2009

This is similarly an Act of parliament enacted in 1982 for the establishment of local authorities in urban authorities namely, neighborhoods, wards, divisions, and urban authorities – town, municipal and city councils. The 2009 amendment [section 201A of the Act] imply to mandate the minister responsible for local government to make regulations guiding smooth conduct and management of elections in urban authorities. The election of neighborhoods chairpersons and members of the corresponding governing committee are steered by section 201A of the Act. To that end, the Act is central to conducting local government elections in the urban authorities.

2.1.5 The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No.2) Act, 2009

The Miscellaneous amendment No. 2 of 2009 introduced sections 87A and 201A in the Local Government (District Authorities) Act Cap 287 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act Cap 288 respectively that mandated to minister responsible for local government to make regulations to the effect. Prior to those amendments local level elections in the rural and urban settings were not legally regulated by central government minister. Moreover, it is important to note that unlike neighborhoods in the urban settings, village governing bodies have body corporate status.



2.1.6 The Local Government Election Regulations 2024

2.1.6.1 The Local Government Regulations for the Election of the village chairperson, members of the village council and hamlet chairperson in district authorities GN, No. 571

These are election regulations promulgated on 12th July 2024 for the purpose of enshrining procedures for the election of the village chairpersons, members of the village governance councils and the hamlet chairpersons; and providing guidance on the procedure for voter education and election observation. The regulations also provide for voter registration, nomination of candidates, conducting election campaigns, polling and resolution of election-related disputes in the district authorities.

2.1.6.2 The Local Government Regulations for the Election of the Hamlet Chairperson in Township Authorities GN, No. 572 2024

These are election regulations promulgated on 12th July 2024 for the purpose of enshrining procedures for election of hamlet chairpersons, providing voter education and conducting election observation, and guiding voter registration, candidates nomination, election campaign, polling and resolution of election-related disputes in the township areas of district authorities.

2.1.6.3 The Local Government Regulations for the Election of the village chairperson, members of the village governing councils and hamlet chairpersons in Urban Authorities GN, No. 573

These are election regulations promulgated on 12th July 2024 for the purpose of enshrining procedures for election of village chairpersons, members of village governing councils and hamlet chairpersons, providing voter education and conducting election observation, and guiding voter registration, candidates nomination, election campaign, polling and resolution of election-related disputes in urban authorities.

2.1.6.4 The Local Government Regulations for the Election for the Election of the hamlet chairpersons and members of neighborhoods governing committees in urban authorities, GN, No. 574

These are election regulations promulgated on 12th July 2024 for the purpose of enshrining procedures for election of neighborhoods chairpersons and members of neighborhoods governing committees, providing voter education and conducting election observation, and



guiding voter registration, candidates nomination, election campaign, polling and resolution of election-related disputes in urban authorities.

2.2 Conclusion

The essence of demonstrating the legal framework governing the local government election is to inform and enable readers of this report to understand the legal, administrative and regulatory framework governing Tanzania local government elections.



CHAPTER THREE

III. VOTER EDUCATION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is particular for providing information about voter education, one of the key components of the program. Given the context, the chapter exposes readers to practical meaning of voter education, approaches invoked in the course of providing voter education and the manner in which voter education was provided. Finally, the chapter assesses content and estimated reach out or number of people reached by voter education program.

3.2 Conceptual framework

3.2.1 Voter education

The legal framework governing local government elections does not provide the meaning of voter education. However, according to the Independent National Election Commission Barometric Voter Registration (BVR) training manual (2024) voter education is defined as practical information provided to citizens on various aspects related to elections, such as civil and political rights, social and economic rights, climate change, gender inclusion et la. Voter education is designed, developed and disseminated or issued for the purpose of sensitizing electorate so they are well informed and equipped with practical knowledge concerning dos and don'ts throughout the electoral process.

3.2.2. Civic education versus voter education

Civic education is broader, hence covers wide range of aspects of civic rights and duties while voter education focuses on specific issues of dos and don'ts by electorate as spelled out in the electoral regulations. Administratively, voter education requires accreditation of the provider by the elections management body – the Independent National Electoral Commission or the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG).

3.2.3. Electoral Management Bodies

As for Tanzania local government election, the Electoral Management Body is construed to mean the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government Authorities.



3.2.4. Election stakeholders

Provision of voter education requires key stakeholders involved in the process at different levels, namely **(i)** security organs, including the Tanzania Police Force, playing the role when required to maintain peace and orderliness. **(ii)** The Office of Registrar of Political Parties, mandated with a role to issue permit to program that follow under the ambit of his office – when a voter education program has direct involvement of political parties. **(iii)** Political Parties, which could be responsible for coordination of their respective members when a voter education program directly targets party members, leaders or executives. **(iv)** government ministry responsible for regulating the businesses Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) accredited to provide voter education. **(v)** Media houses – inclusive of mainstream and social media presented in the organizational form of digital, electronic or print industries. **(ix)** development partners – international development organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies with core interest in promoting democracy and good governance. **(vi)** faith-based organizations. **(vii)** Opinion leaders across ethnic and tribal sections of society.

3.3 Approaches – tools and methods used to provide voter education

Effective from August 17th 2024 the President's Office, Regional Administration, and Local Government, the election management body for local government elections, announced a two weeks' timeframe invitation for NGOs to apply for provision of voter education accreditation targeting the upcoming elections scheduled on November 27, 2024.

The Legal and Human Rights Centre duly applied for providing voter education and was on the 30th September 2024 officially accredited to the effect – granted to conduct voter education in 15 regions. The accreditation covered a cord of election cycle, i.e. between 1st October and 26th November 2024.

3.3.1. Social media campaign


During the epoch of 4th Industrial Revolution, application of social media is duly recognized as the most effective tool of mass communication and public awareness. The data from Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) indicate 31 million Tanzanians actively engage in the social media – Facebook, X, Instagram and many others. Tanzania official population figure is 61 million people (National Census, 2022). LHRC leveraged such magnificent social media active presence and visibility of the population to launch voter education campaign, especially through Facebook, X and Instagram platforms. Posters and jingles were created and disseminated through existing LHRC social media platforms X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Facebook, and LHRC website. Tracking of visitors and followers on the social media accounts, as part of monitoring & evaluation, indicate approximately 13 million Tanzanians were reached with voter education messages.



The voter education campaign messages covered key practical topics, including;


- Eligibility criteria of voters.
- Locations designated for voter registration.
- Candidate eligibility criteria.
- Available mechanisms and approaches for resolving election-related disputes.
- Election timetable indicating deadlines/dates for voter registration, campaigns and polling.
- The voting process.
- The roles of stakeholders in the local government election process.

The social media messages reached the wider population, mainly youth and urban population.



Pix 3.3.1/1: LHRC Instagram page showing voter eligibility criteria message





Px 3.3.1/2: LHRC Social Media Analytics for the month of September 2024

3.3.2. Voter education by way of community radio

The maintains a Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with 26 community radio stations across the country. The radio stations are rooted in, and operate from grassroots level of society communicating messages that primarily cater for community news and information needs. To that end, community radio stations have emerged, therefore considered the most effective media for disseminating voter education material information during local government elections.

Weekly repeat voter education programs were aired by each partner community radio station. The program content was replete with practical messages informing voters on various relevant aspects of electoral process undertakings – voter registration, eligibility criteria, role of stakeholders et la. It is estimated that community radio messages directly reached over 15 million people. Voters residing in the remotest rural areas were also reached by key electoral messages beamed through community radio stations.

3.3.3. Voter education by way of national television

Moreover, LHRC leveraged its longstanding partnership with the Independent Television (ITV) station to deliver voter education messages for 2024 local government elections. The approach was using the existing popular television programs – *Kipimajoto* and *Meza Huru* – to inform the public about pertinent issues obtaining in the electoral process.

The popular programs messages informed the public about electoral process plans and changes, including voter registration and eligibility criteria, candidate qualification, polling



procedures, and role of stakeholders. Importantly, a single live *Kipimajoto* program broadcast on ITV also extended its reach through multiple channels, including ITV YouTube channel, Radio One, Capital Radio, ITV Instagram account, and ITV Facebook page. This multi-platform convergence dissemination strategy broadened voter education message accessibility to reach national audiences effectively.



Pix 3.3.3/1: The public was invited to tune in the Kipimajoto program held on 4th October 2024

One show of *Kipimajoto* program show meant occasioning 6 messages through 6 sister channels or platforms. *Kipimajoto* program, which is estimated to have reached 6 million people, was conducted in collaboration with the PO-RALG.





**KIPINDI CHA KIPIMA
JOTO IJUMAA HII**

1 Novemba 2024 3:00 Usiku ITV

MADA:
**"Zoezi la uchukuaji fomu za wagombea
 uchaguzi wa serikali za mitaa.
 Je nini tahmini ya wadau?"**

MIHAYO KADETE
AFISA SHERIA
MWANDAMIZI-TAMISEMI

ESTER THOMAS
NAIBU KATIBU MKUU
BARA ACT WAZALENDU

RAYMOND KANEGENE
AFISA MWANDAMIZI
WA UCHECHEMUZI NA
MABORESHO LHRC

[f](#) [i](#) [X](#)
@humanrightstz

HAKI

SUBSCRIBE
@Haki TV

Pix 3.3.3/2: PO-RALG collaborated with PO-RALG to run Kipamajoto program

Other voter education messages were transmitted through Clouds TV station using its famous program: clouds 360. The program allocated over 40 minutes to air voter education messages to capture the attention of an estimated 1 million viewers. Moreover, additional voter education messages were transmitted through Azam TV through the famous program *Mizani ya Wiki*, which aired 8 frequencies of the program taking stock and analysis of weekly election-merited news and events. The data indicates 5 million viewers were estimated to have followed the programs. One voter education messaging program was aired by Upendo TV.

3.3.4. Voter education through national radio broadcast, online and print media

LHRC extensively utilized national radio broadcasters, online and print, media to provide voter education messages. A number of national radio stations were engaged, including Crown Radio, Clouds Radio, East African Radio, Dodoma FM Radio, AFM Dodoma Radio, Njombe FM, Radio One, and international broadcasters such as DW Radio, BBC Radio, and VOA Radio. Most broadcasts were aired live although some broadcasts went as pre-



recorded sessions. Moreover, online discussion platforms powered by Jamii forums, Jambo online TV and The Chanzo covered and disseminated voter education messages to high level caliber of audience.



Afisa Uchaguzi atoa elimu kwa wananchi kushiriki Uchaguzi S/Mitaa 2024



Haki TV

12K subscribers



Subscribed



1



Share



Pix 3.3.4/1: LHRC Program Officer taking part in one of online TV platforms

Assessment indicates 7 million voters to have been reached through national radio broadcast, online and print media – considered as enormous impact.

3.3.5. Voter education through press conferences

Voter education program also adopted press conferences as supplementary means of disseminating messages. When it was considered vital to directly address journalists directly press statements were developed and read before journalist explaining matters of electoral process interest to voters through members of the press. One significant press conference was held on 22nd November 2024 at Seashells Hotel, Dar es Salaam, urging voters to vote as campaign period was nearing to end.

On many occasions media houses, including the television and radio stations, international broadcasters with Tanzania audience, newspapers, and online platforms took part in those



press conferences. Messages from press conferences are estimated to have reached an estimated audience of about 5 million people.



Pix 3.3.5/1: The Guardian newspaper reported on one of many press conferences: 22nd November 2024.

3.3.5. Voter education through exclusive interviews

Offering exclusive interviews was another mode employed to disseminate voter education messages for 2024 local government elections. The program created so much newsworthiness that some national media houses sought exclusive interviews pertaining to issues prompted by the program. On many occasions the interviews were of specific focus or topical regarding emerging issues in the electoral process. Seven (7) exclusive interviews were conducted addressing issues relating to voter education for 2024 local government elections.

3.4. Conclusion

The various voter education approaches discussed above; social media, television and radio programs the most effective modes for delivering voter education due information, communication and technology element bankrolling broader, effective and efficient reach out to the target groups. As detailed above, over 10 media houses collaborated with LHRC to broadcast the voter education program, apparently contributing significantly to raise awareness and fostering participation of citizens in the 2024 local government elections.



CHAPTER FOUR

IV. ELECTION OBSERVATION: VOTER REGISTRATION & NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

4.1 Introduction

As part of local government election cycle, October 11th to 20th 2024, was a period designated for voter registration. Moreover, PO-RALG set October 26th to November 1st 2024 for nomination of candidates, during which the latter collected, filled and submitted candidature nomination forms. LHRC was keen to observe the entire electoral process, apart from conducting voter education, noting it was also accredited to observe elections. Local government election observation was conducted through various approaches, including full utilization of the media as well as other standard assessment mechanisms.

LHRC recruited, trained and deployed the election observation mission in fifteen (15) regions, namely Kagera, Njombe, Singida, Geita, Simiyu, Lindi, Mtwara, Morogoro, Mbeya, Katavi, Iringa, Mara, Ruvuma, Manyara, and Songwe. The election observer mission observed, identified, and documented several electoral process issues, including irregularities detailed in the subsequent sections below.

4.1.1 Voter Registration

The timetable that PO-RALG published indicated registration of voters would be done between 11th and 20th October 2024. LHRC monitored voter registration process by way of media reporting follow-up of the exercise. Election observers stationed in the respective regions monitored the relevant material information regularly reported in the mainstream media or discussed in the credible social media platforms.

4.1.2 Registration of ineligible voters; allegedly under 18 years

Age is the key qualification for universal suffrage and therefore voter registration. It is a constitutional dictum that voters must be 18 years and above¹. Observers reported underage primary schools pupils or secondary schools students under the age of 18 queued and registered as voters in Arusha, Kibaha, Katavi and Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and

¹ The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, art. 5(3)(a).



Mbeya.². The reports were frequently cited from multiple regions, raising concerns about lack of strict adherence to the law³. Age as voter qualification is also spelt out in the election regulations⁴.

4.1.3 Registration stations being designated in the CCM cadres' residences

The Local Government Elections Regulations 2024 clearly provides that registrations stations shall be in either public schools, public offices or open spaces occupied by the public. However, reports from Arusha indicated that one registration station was designated at the private residence of a CCM leader, which contravenes the regulations.⁵ Similar incidents were also reported in Kilimanjaro region, specifically in Mbokomu Ward, Moshi Rural Constituency.

4.1.4 Voters registered at multiple Registration Stations.

The Local Government Election Regulations classify registration of a voter at multiple/more than one station as an electoral offence. Nonetheless, observers across the country reported rampant multiple registrations of voters in various registration stations. Such electoral anomaly was acknowledged and clarified by the minister responsible for local government elections, implying prevalence of the malpractices during voter registration process.

² Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBbd7suNIRu/?igsh=Y3IIMncwaHB4ZjIj> (Accessed on 24th October 2024). and <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBLTfUSN-Ot/?igsh=MWQ1MDViMjlycHY3cQ==> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).

³ Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBaviQdlEOq/?igsh=MWRyOWtzbnloNWc2Mg==> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).

⁴ Enshrined under the Local Government Election Regulations 2024, GN, No. 571-74.

⁵ Available at https://www.instagram.com/reel/DA_Wu8CPAby/?igsh=MWZiNXE3MGZtNHQ4bw== (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



4.1.5 Political parties' debility to deploy voter registration agents

The Local Government Election Regulations 2024 grant political parties the right and obligation to deploy agents overseeing voter registration process, hence ensure transparency and integrity of electoral process and the outcome. However, election observers across the country reported CCM to have deployed the agents in designated registration stations. The data indicates CHADEMA having followed, albeit at significantly lower coverage level. Many other political parties failed to deploy voter registration agents, citing funding paucity as the primary reason for such course.

4.1.6 Confusion Regarding the Authority Mandated to Supervise Elections

The challenge considered widespread, therefore reported in the mainstream and social media was a confusion regarding election management body mandated to coordinate and supervise the 2024 local government elections. The anatomy of confusion was prevailing public knowledge/belief that the Independent National Electoral Commission was the mandated body to the effect⁶. However, during local government election process preparations, the public noted INEC exclusively focused on updating the Permanent Voter Register – Barometric Voter Registration (BVR) while the PO-RALG assumed the duty of coordination and supervision of the local government elections 2024. The observers reported general public view of expecting to use voter Identity Cards (IDs) issued by INEC for LGE voting.⁷ That view did not materialize but instead, created confusion.

4.1.7 Registration of Voters in Absentia

Registration of voters in absentia is another electoral process anomaly widely reported by observers. There were incidents of voters' dismay upon discovering they had been registered to vote in absentia and without their knowledge or consent. On many occasions, voters visiting the registration stations, which is a requirement under the Local Government Election Regulations, found their names had been registered already. Not only did that

⁶ [Section 10(1)c of] The Independent National Election Commission Act No. 2/2024

⁷ TAMISEMI yatoa ufafanuzi kuhusu daftari la mpiga kura na orodha ya wapiga kura. Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DASirfkMUNe/?igsh=MWJhcjdvc2N6eTdybg==> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



anomaly contravene the laws governing local government elections in Tanzania but it also raised serious concerns about integrity of local government elections – the process and outcome. Moreover, incidents of some voters being registered in areas that were not their normal residences, further compounded irregularity of elections, hence undermining public confidence in the electoral process and outcome.⁸

4.1.8 Registration Officers Operating Outside Designated Stations

The other anomaly that characterized the local government elections and was frequently reported by observers and consistently covered in the media was registration officers conducting voter registration outside the officially designated stations, as required under the Local Government Election Regulations. Instead of staying at the assigned registration locations, some officers were reportedly seen on a mobile mode, roving the neighborhoods; visiting voters' residences, convincing voters to register. That practice is contrary to the regulations, which require that voters be registered only at the officially designated registration stations. Again, such unsanctioned breach of electoral code of conduct, adherence to electoral procedures and acceptable conduct of election management compromised overall integrity of elections.⁹

4.1.9 Concerns Regarding Credibility of the Declared Number of Registered Voters

Public mistrust surrounded the 21st October 2024 official announcement of the total number (i.e. 31,282,331) of registered voters for the local government elections, 2024. The announcement by the PO-RALG minister suffered credibility risk in that it sparked public [disapproval] debate in the media. According to the minister responsible for local government elections, Hon. Mohamed Mchengherwa, ninety one percent (91%),

⁸ Available at https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBF4st_MEHe/?igsh=M2NhZzcwY3RlejN (Accessed on 24th October 2024)>

Jambo TV: Kuibuliwa kwa madudu kwenye vituo na wasiwasi kuhusu uchaguzi wa serikali za mitaa. Available at https://youtu.be/xDMhBU0BM9c?si=E9-OBaOA1_N6fuLe (Accessed on 24th October 2024). Mara digital: Majina hewa ya wapiga kura yadaiwa kubainika kwenye orodha ya wakazi Tarime mjini, CHADEMA wanena. Available at <https://youtu.be/7v7kCVHcuMs?si=qiyOVqvUhxV-uPdk> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).

⁹ Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBLgS7glfM/?igsh=NmYyNjNnMzk5cHNk> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



approximately 31 million targeted voters¹⁰ registered to vote in the local government elections 2024. However, the authenticity of this figure remains questionable when compared/crosschecked with the outcome of the 2022 Tanzania Population and Housing Census. The discrepancy between the duo government sources raises concerns and questions regarding accuracy or correctness and transparency test of voter registration. The government through the office National Statistics Bureau (NBS) issued the clarification on this number of registered voters and the national census population.¹¹

4.1.10 Inconsistency of Voter Registers vs Public Lists for Inspection/Objections

The total number of registered voters available in the registers compared with the lists of voters displayed on the noticeboards for verifications and invoking potential objections was another area that of concern raised by specifically political parties. The latter flagged potential electoral irregularity surrounding the conspicuous inconsistency immediately after voter registration close on October 20, 2024¹².

The flagged and reported inconsistency appears to be significant given the displayed lists showing bloated number of voters compared to records documented in the official voter registers at the time of the registration deadline. Such discrepancy raises concerns about accuracy and transparency of the registration process, potentially undermining public trust in the integrity of the election.

4.1.11 Antiquated Voter Registration Technology

Voter registration was done manually despite apparently prevailing availability and application of digital technology by Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in the country. Non procurement and application of, or indecisiveness to apply appropriate technology for managing and coordination of local government elections 2024 may point to

¹⁰ The Chanzo, Waziri Mchenherwa: Kati ya watanzania milioni 32 wenye sifa milioni 31 wamejiandikisha. Available at <https://youtu.be/5ZGFT1KE9TY?si=x9xxnTs1Ei2iyNfq> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).

¹¹ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=847516187251897>

¹² Jambo Tv, CHADEMA Simiyu yajipanga kudhiiti hujuma uchaguziS/Mitaa. Available at https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBf_YG-CXZy/?igsh=d3dINWx2bDhiZ2Vt (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



intending to achieve electoral schism that benefit the incumbent. Reliance on manual registration of voters undermines credibility of elections and exposes electoral process to potential abuse, including multiple registration without detection.

4.1.12 Low level of Civic Competence and Voter Education

PO-RALG did not prioritize voter education as a way of improving civic competence contributing to voter-election information awareness across the country. The non-governmental organizations that PO-RALG accredited to produce and disseminate voter education for local government elections struggled in vain to secure funding to the effect. The little efforts made by media to cover and report news about the elections were not mainstreamed to target voters, but rather political statements of leaders, therefore compromising reaching out to wider public and particularly voters. Generally, there was no serious voter education program planned and executed by either PO-RALG or organizations accredited to the effect. Attempts by social media vehicles conveying election messages was probably the only reliable yet constrained source of voter education needed for local government elections.

4.1.13 The Departed Listed as Valid Voters

Election regulations provide the public with an opportunity to scrutinize/validate registered voters within each designated voting stations in the neighborhoods and villages. According to the program announced by PO-RALG voters and the general public would inspect the names of listed and publicly displayed registered voters effectively from 21st October 2024 going forward. The essence of inspection is to verify and oversee correctness of the names of registered voters for corrections where and if required or lodge objections if circumstances allow¹³.

¹³ Mara digital: Majina hewa ya wapiga kura yadaiwa kubainika kwenye orodha ya wakazi Tarime Mjini, CHADEMA wanena. Available at <https://youtu.be/7v7kCVHcuMs?si=qiyOVqvUhxV-uPdk> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



During inspection the media reported sporadic incidents of names of deceased persons registered as voters for the 2025 local government elections taking place on 27th November 2024.¹⁴

4.2 Drawing Provisional Conclusions

The details provided above, and as exhibited in the sections below suffice to point out and draw provisional conclusion that the 2024 local government electoral process operational activities were significantly blemished by irregularities coupled with lack of voter awareness.

4.2.1 Assistant Returning Officers Arbitrary Management Characters

Election regulations (GN No. 571, GN No. 572, GN No. 573, and GN No. 574) direct during nomination week, the Assistant Returning Officers (AROs) to keep their offices open – 8:00

¹⁴A bishop from Shisuvi ward in Mbeya who had died in February 2024 and one Weison Mwambeye who had already died many years ago, but all these were found in the register book as voters. This was noticed at the time of inspecting the register book which was placed in the public place for inspection and objection. Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBdRhCRoAEF/?igsh=aDhuZnMxcTOyd3d5> (Accessed on 24th October 2024).



a.m. to 4:00 p.m. – for seven consecutive days to facilitate aspirants collection and submission of nomination forms, ensuring their presence without delays during the period.

However, observers and media reported incidences of AROs discretionary inconsistent presence in their respective designated offices that made it difficult for candidates to collect



Pix 4.2.1/1: Mwananchi Newspaper coverage on the arbitrary behaviors of AROs during the 26th October to 1st November 2024 week.

and submit nomination forms timely.

It was reported in Kinama village, Patimbo ward, Kiteto constituency, Manyara region that all CHADEMA candidates were detained by police from the Pori Namba Moja police station, and when their release was secured the candidates failed to submit nomination forms timely because the ARO was not available in the office to attend the candidates¹⁵.

Similarly, in Kwediboma ward, Kilindi District, Tanga region or in Newala district, Mtwara region AROs were reported as largely absent causing or becoming obstacles to candidates collecting or returning nomination forms. Attempts seeking Returning Officers (ROs)

¹⁵ JAMBO TV Online, Benson Kigaila na Godbless Lema wanaongea waandishi wa habari muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/85yijLM1PPQ?si=CSlyCKCZH3mcarnq> Accessed on 4th October 2024 at 18:11hrs.



intervention in Kilindi, Kiteto or Newala¹⁶ failed. To that end, candidates in many villages and neighborhoods failed to return nomination forms by deadline.¹⁷

4.2.2 Premature Nomination and Endorsement of Candidates

The Local Government Election Regulations provide that endorsement and appointment of candidates by returning officers should be undertaken 19 days before election date, meaning such appointments were expected to take effect on November 8, 2024. However, contrary to the provision of the regulations the ARO in Kwa Kibuyu village Kipungwini ward, Pangani district nominated the candidates one day after the nomination period had closed, hence prematurely declared candidates as officially appointed. Notably, all the appointed candidates were from the CCM party.¹⁸

This premature appointment violated the regulations and was deemed unlawful and void from onset. However, intervention was carried out, thence nullified the nominations as corrective measure¹⁹ upon reporting the anomaly to higher authorities.

Similarly, in Same district, Same West constituency, AROs had appointed and nominated candidates in nearly all wards by November 4, except in Ruvu ward, where three candidates were prematurely disqualified. This action abrogated the regulations specifying candidate appointments and nominations should occur precisely 19 days before the election date.

4.2.3 AROs Denying Candidates Copies of Nomination Forms

Going by Local Government Election Regulations, candidates are entitled to get copies of their respective nomination forms as a means of verification for picking and returning the

¹⁶ JAMBO TV, Mwenyekiti wa kanda ya kusini anazungumza muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/OBd1e5yg0Jk?si=KK5kQ-zUdHJh7Mj>, accessed on 5th November 2024.

¹⁷ JAMBO TV Online, Benson Kigaila na Godbless Lema wanaongea waandishi wa habari muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/85yijLM1PPQ?si=CSlyCKCZH3mcarnq> Accessed on 4th October 2024 at 18:11hrs.

¹⁸ Regulation 18 of the Local Government Election Regulations for the election of the village chairperson, kitongoji chairperson and 25 members forming part of the village council, GN, No. 571 of 2024

¹⁹ JAMBO TV Online, Benson Kigaila na Godbless Lema wanaongea waandishi wa habari muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/85yijLM1PPQ?si=CSlyCKCZH3mcarnq> Accessed on 4th October 2024 at 18:11hrs



nomination forms, hence helping candidates to keep records, wherein no formal documentation is available.

However, the media and observers in Ngorongoro constituency reported AROs unusually summoning candidates whereat unduly seized their forms without giving a credible reason²⁰. The candidates were initially served with the copies, but effectively from 3rd November 2024 the same were recalled and seized from among opposition candidates. A similar incident was reported in Mtwara²¹. This raises serious concerns regarding the election management machinery compliance with virtues of transparency, accountability and rule of law.

4.2.4 State Machinery Interference

State organs without legal mandate to supervise or coordinate elections as per Local Government Election Regulations 2024 interfered with supervision and coordination of elections. The machinery placed in the District Commissioners, Regional Commissioners and individual political were reported supervising electoral process or issuing unlawful arrest orders. Election observers and the media reported the Kilimanjaro RC, Same DC and CCM National Executive Committee (NEC) member for Manyara region issuing orders to command ROs to take actions in their respective jurisdictions. Those orders were legally void and compromised election impartiality²² principle and integrity.

4.2.5 Suspicious Death of Opposition Candidate

During the period of picking and returning of nomination forms, the media reported suspicious death of Joseph Remigius, a 52-year-old opposition candidate vying a chair position for Kalagala village of Misenyi District, Kagera Region. Remigius was reported missing on October 31, 2024, and news of his death began hit social and mainstream media

²⁰ JAMBO TV Online, Benson Kigaila na Godbless Lema wanaongea waandishi wa habari muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/85yijLM1PPQ?si=CSlyCKCZH3mcarnq> Accessed on 4th October 2024 at 18:11hrs

²¹ JAMBO TV, Mwenyekiti wa kanda ya kusini anazungumza muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/OBd1e5yg0Jk?si=KK5kQ-zUdHJh7Mj>, accessed on 5th November 2024.

²² JAMBO TV Online, Benson Kigaila na Godbless Lema wanaongea waandishi wa habari muda huu. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/85yijLM1PPQ?si=CSlyCKCZH3mcarnq> Accessed on 4th October 2024 at 18:11hrs



on November 1, 2024. His death sparked public debate over security guarantee for opposition candidates and cause of the death. State authorities²³ later issued a public statement to the effect. No more similar deaths were reported at the time²⁴.

4.2.6 Few Women and Persons with Disability Made it to Elective Offices

The observers report shows limited participation of women and Persons with Disability (PWDs) vying for elective positions in the hamlets, neighborhoods and village elective political leadership.²⁵ While specific records/statistics and comprehensive analysis of women and PWDs participation in the 2024 elections are not available yet, observers' general indicative reports indicate only few women and PWDs were visibly engaged in the nomination process. This trend may not be running far from the 2019 elections scenario thence 2.1 percent, 6.7 percent and 12.6 percent of women elective leaders as villages, hamlets and neighborhoods chairpersons were elected respectively. This low mark for women and PWDs elective office leadership in the hamlets, villages and neighborhoods is attributed to restrictive and harmful cultural practices that hinder women's full participation in democratic and electoral processes.²⁶

4.2.7 Politics of Disinformation and Misinformation

Media reporting during the electoral process was occasionally engulfed by disinformation and misinformation. For instance, a fake news story circulated in the media claiming CHADEMA party had withdrawn from the electoral process, but it was later found to be fake,

²³ GLOBAL TV online, KIFO cha MGOMBEA wa CHADEMA SERIKALI za MITAA- KAMANDA AFICHUA ALIPATA AJLI KABLA HAJAFARIKI. Available at <https://youtu.be/7CIhAi9I70w?si=guzAlrHPScx-YBfM> accessed on 5th November at 12:39am.

²⁴ GLOBAL TV online, KIFO cha MGOMBEA wa CHADEMA SERIKALI za MITAA- KAMANDA AFICHUA ALIPATA AJLI KABLA HAJAFARIKI. Available at <https://youtu.be/7CIhAi9I70w?si=guzAlrHPScx-YBfM> accessed on 5th November at 12:39am

²⁵ <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/oped/why-women-have-slim-chance-in-2024-local-government-elections-4763836>

²⁶ The chanzo: Shamrashamra za uchaguzi wanawake CHADEMA, CCM wajitosa kuchukua fomu. Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBynr9hSTjV/?igsh=MTk2dDZkNzd2ZzdjaQ==> Accessed on 5th November 2024 at 14:35hrs.



he reportage, and was denounced by the party.²⁷ The misinformation misled the public and caused unnecessary confusion to voters.²⁸

4.3 How the Media Covered Elections



Pix 4.3/1: NIPASHE newspaper: Extensive coverage of opposition candidates massive disqualifications; 10th November 2024

According to the Local Government Election Regulations, candidates' nomination was to be executed 19 days before the election day. Therefore, as per Regulation 18, the designated due date for nomination of candidates was 8th November 2024.²⁹ Once the nomination process was completed, the next step would involve lodging objections and appeals with the District Appeals Committee for candidates who felt unduly disqualified from contesting the elections.³⁰ The following are the key issues that were observed:

²⁷ John Mrema, CHADEMA hatujajitoa wala hatuna mpango wa kujitoa, available at <https://www.instagram.com/p/DBosVHoopTd/?igsh=MTNvYzVOMWE0azlIMw==> Accessed on 5th November 2024.

²⁸ John Mrema, CHADEMA hatujajitoa wala hatuna mpango wa kujitoa, available at <https://www.instagram.com/p/DBosVHoopTd/?igsh=MTNvYzVOMWE0azlIMw==> Accessed on 5th November 2024.

²⁹ Regulation 18 of the Local Government Regulation for the Election of the village chairperson, kitongoji chairperson and members of the village council 2024.

³⁰ Regulation 23((3) of the Local Government Election for the Election of the village chairperson, kitongoji chairperson and members of the village council 2024.



4.3.1 Opposition [Candidates] Massive Disqualification from Contesting Elections

The frequently and widely reported claims by the media and observers were opposition candidates massive disqualification to contest elections on flimsy and unjustified reasons. The opposition candidates strongly condemned the AROs unduly disqualification where no valid grounds existed. The ACT Wazalendo party leader Hon. Dorothy Semu reported on 9th November 2024 that sixty percent (60%) of party candidates were axed from contesting the elections³¹.



Pix. 4.3.1/1: Mwananchi newspaper: Extensive coverage of opposition candidates massive disqualifications; 9th November 2024

³¹ JAMBO TV Online, KIONGOZI WA CHAMA ACT WAZALENDO NDUGU DOROTHY SEMU ANAZUNGUMZA NA WAANDISHI WA HABARI. Available at https://www.youtube.com/live/XUusK-bYpIU?si=5KjFCClwf_MoUrk3 accessed on 11th November 2024 at 12:00pm.



Mr. John Mrema, CHADEMA spokesperson, alleged the party candidates from various parts of the country were disqualified to contest elections by AROs without justifiable reasons.³²

Moreover, the media and observers in Arusha reported disqualification of CCM candidates who were contesting neighborhoods elective positions in the city on similar grounds whereby nine (9) CCM candidates were reportedly in disqualified.³³



Pix. 4.3.1/2: Mwananchi newspaper: 10th November 2024 story about haphazard disqualification of opposition candidates

As a way of public action to denounce haphazard management of elections some ward councilors in Mtwara Municipal Council rescinded from participating in the council meeting. In response, the minister responsible for local government elections, Hon. Mohamed Mchengerwa, urged all candidates aggrieved by AROs to file objections and appeals, as outlined in the Local Government Election Regulations.³⁴

³² MWANZO TV PLUS: JOHN MREMA ANAZUNGUMZA NA WAANDISHI WA HABARI MUDA HUU, SIKILIZA. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/RCJ8DEBB1Ko?si=7VyuAbnqRWTxaFMq> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 17:52hrs.

³³ Machachali Tv: CCM NAO WATANGAZA WAGOMBEA WAO 9 KUENGULIWA ARUSHA, GODBLESS LEMA ADAI WAACHE USANII. Available at <https://youtu.be/TMpjVYzABkw?si=EieEEN7PmIV2GLLI> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 18:26 hrs.

³⁴ Regulation 23(3) of the Local Government Election for the Election of the village chairperson, the Kitongoji chairperson and members of the village council 2024.



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TANZANIA
Jumata, Novemba 11, 2024
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BIASHARA YA VYUMA CHAKAVU, PLASTIKI

Chaka la uhalifu

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Gharuma za vili vya kuu-
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la Ushafu na Usimamizi wa
Mazngira (NEMC) wakati
tozo zake kwa mwaka ni kati
ya Sh4.5 milioni kwa wafanya-
biashara wadogo.

Wizi majumbani
Si ajabu katika maeneo
ya barabara kuwa
vyuma vya madaraja,
kingo za barabara,
aluma au mifumo ya
chembe za mapigikwa
vinung'olewa.
Hata kwenye majumba,
nondo na vitu vingine
vyenye adili ya chuma
vinababwa na kusawa
kama chuma chakavu.
Tawondia na Tawondia
zaka hasara.

Yatajwa kuchochea wizi wa vyuma vya
miundombinu ya barabara, maji na umeme,
vifaa vya majumbani. Ni kwa ajili ya urejelezaji
viwandani, kuuza nje. Vilio vyatawala kila kona

HABARI UK 4 & 5

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Ujenzi machinjio Vingunguti pasua kichwa
Dar es Salaam. Madi
wa machinjio ya Vingunguti
umelwa ana kutokana
na ukosefu wa chumba
cha hariri, changamoto
za vilaa, na... **UK 20**

NDANI
Habari, makala mibambali
za michezo, ndani ya jirida
lote la Sports Mkeji

UKURASA 11 - 17

Pix. 4.3.1/3: Mwananchi newspaper: 11th November 2024 story about opposition uphill task to object/appeal AROs decisions

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WADAI wagombea wao kukatwa, Mchengerwa atoa neno, CCM yasisitiza haki... **Endelea ukurasa wa 3**

Wastaafu sasa kujihakiki kwa simu za mkononi
UKURASA 2

Nipashe
WhatsApp Chaneli

Katibu wa NEC ya CCM, Rikadi, Uenchi na Mafuriko, Amos Mkalala

Kiongozi wa ACT-Wazalendo, Dorothy Seme

Mwenyekiti wa Chadema, Freeman Mbowe

Waziri wa TAMDEMI, Mohamed Mchengerwa

Pix. 4.3.1/4: NIPASHE newspaper: Extensive coverage of opposition candidates massive disqualifications; 9th November 2024



The widely reported grounds for massive disqualifications of overly opposition candidates were not as strictly stated in Regulation 5 of the Local Government Election Regulations for the election of village chairpersons, hamlet chairpersons, and members of the village governing councils. The reasons that AROs quoted were typically rather than substantive grounds, which raise concerns about fairness and integrity of elections.

4.3.2 Closure of offices during objections and appeals

The filing of objections and appeals is an essential part of the electoral process. After the closure of the nomination form submission period, the next step involves lodging objections and appeals for candidates who were disqualified by returning officers. This process began on 9th November 2024 and continued through 10th November 2024.



Pix. 4.3.2/1: NIPASHE newspaper: November 11th 2024 story covered opposition candidates disqualification

The newspapers and digital media reported schemes; AROs in various villages and neighborhoods kept their offices closed as a strategy to abdicate responsibilities of deciding the objections and/or appeals they had caused and/or effected. Incidents of that nature were reported in Arumeru, Hai in Kilimanjaro, and even other regions across the country. This



strategy caused, in contrast, only a few objections and appeals to have been successfully lodged without any restrictions or difficulties.³⁵ Again, this scheme compromised credibility of outcomes of nomination objections, appeals and entire election results.

4.3.3 Forgeries; Appointment of Candidates Not Contesting Elective Positions

The media and observers reported incidents quite unusual and unprecedented in Tanzania elections. Incidents of purported candidates were reported in Kagera, Shinyanga or Simiyu regions with AROs having forged candidates' nominations purporting to vie for the hamlets chairperson positions with sponsorship of small political parties, including CHAUMA, the leadership of which denied sponsoring any candidate. Those enlisted to the effect denied to have picked nomination forms despite being nominated as candidates. Again, such forgeries compromised the integrity of elections. Forgery is criminal offense under the Tanzanian law, and it is recommended that criminal sanctions be pursued against those in the public offices who were involved in those fraudulent activities to face appropriate legal consequences.

4.3.4 Only Few Opposition Candidates Sailed Through

The media and observers reported the inability of the opposition parties to field candidates contesting elective political offices in the villages, neighborhoods and hamlets. Such inability leveraged the incumbent CCM to sail through unopposed in many rural and urban areas. It is estimated that the opposition fielded only sixty percent (60%) of the contested elective political positions in the villages, neighborhoods and hamlets. The main opposition CHADEMA admitted to have failed to mobilize in many villages and urban areas. In Nachingwea district for example, CHADEMA fielded candidates in eighty (80) out of 127 villages whereas AROs approved only nine (9) out of 271 fielded hamlets positions³⁶.

³⁵ <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DCJTCnzonfc/?igsh=NGxnc3Y3OHhjOGR3> accessed on 11th November 2024.

³⁶ CHADEMA NACHINGWE WATEMA CHECHE, MSIMAMIZI WA UCHAGUZI ATOA MAELEKEZO. Available at <https://youtu.be/mKRiuEYs0E?si=IJAwo4ITHyqEOYbH> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 16:46pm.



In seventy-eight (78) villages of Serengeti district CHADEMA fielded twenty-six (26) contestants in the corresponding number of villages (26) but the candidates were disqualified. Moreover, CHADEMA candidates vying chair positions in one hundred fifty-five (155) of three hundred sixty one (361) hamlets were also disqualified by AROs.³⁷ In Kilosa district, CHADEMA fielded seventy (70) candidates in the available elective positions in one hundred thirty-eight (138) villages, which equals fifty percent (50%). As for the contested elective offices in the eight hundred and eleven (811) hamlets, CHADEMA fielded candidates in two hundred eighty-seven (287) hamlets chair positions only.³⁸

In the two hundred twenty-two (222) neighborhoods of the City Council of Dodoma, CHADEMA contested in eighty-one (81) elective positions only. The table below presents an overview of how other opposition parties' contested elective political offices in the City Council of Dodoma.

Table 4.3.4/1: Opposition parties' contests for elective political offices in Dodoma City Council

S/N	Name of political party	# of contested positions
1.	ACT-Wazalendo	9
2.	CHADEMA	81
3.	AAFP	9
4.	Demokrasia Makini	5
5.	UMD	3
6.	NCCR MAGEUZI	3

³⁷ SERENGETI DC Digital. UKWELI JUU YA KUENGULIWA KWA VIONGOZI WA CHADEMA SERENGETI, DED NA MWANASHERIA WATOA UFAFANUZI. Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DCJTCnzonfc/?igsh=NGxnc3Y3OHhjOGR3>, accessed on 11th November 2024 at 17:02hrs.

³⁸ AYO TV: KAULI YA PROF J YAMUIBUA MKURUGENZI KILOSA, AJITokeza KUKANUSHA "SIO SAHIHI": Available at <https://youtu.be/5vv6StODGO0?si=2xM9CY5QatIsekI2> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 17:18hrs.



7.	CCK	2
8.	CHAUMA	2
9.	SAU	2
10	ADA TADEA	1
11	ADC	1
12	UDP	1
13	TLP	1
14	NLD	1
15	CUF	1
16	NRA	1
17	UPDP	4

NLD, CUF, NRA and DP candidates failed to return nomination forms.³⁹

In the thirty-eight (38) villages of Rufiji district council CHADEMA fielded chairperson candidacy in only one village (1) who was however disqualified by ARO from contesting the elections, while the same main opposition party fielded only two (2) contestants out of the available one hundred seventy-eight (178) competitive hamlets positions.⁴⁰

Countrywide CHADEMA had managed to field candidates by ninety percent (90%) in all available competitive neighborhoods positions while in the competitive villages positions CHADEMA fielded candidates by eighty five percent (85%) and fielded candidates for hamlets competitive chair positions by seventy five percent (75%).⁴¹ Nevertheless, the

³⁹ MSIMAMIZI WA UCHAGUZI HALMASHAURI YA JIJI LA DODOMA AKANUSHA UVUMI: Available at <https://youtu.be/hcNgS3xzXjg?si=E95ETBKbbJbniC9P> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 17:41hrs.

⁴⁰ WASAFI TV: DED RUFJI AFAFANUA MADAI YA CHADEMA. Available at <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DCO-ANYCEhV?igsh=Z2R4d3g3bDJicGhx> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 18:43hrs

⁴¹ MWANZO TV PLUS: JOHN MREMA ANAZUNGUMZA NA WAANDISHI WA HABARI MUDA HUU, SIKILIZA. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/live/RCJ8DEBB1Ko?si=7VyuAbnqRWTxaFMq> accessed on 11th November 2024 at 17:52hrs.



incumbent CCM retains competitive advantage of maintaining governing structure from grassroots to the national level.

CHAPTER FIVE

V. ELECTION CAMPAIGN

5.1 Introduction

The Local Government Election 2024 Regulations direct election campaigns to be conducted for a duration of seven (7) days, commencing 20th November throughout to 26th November 2024, whereby contestants for elective political office positions for village chairs, hamlet chairs, village governing council membership – in the district councils/authorities; neighborhoods chairs and governing committee members in the urban authorities; and hamlet chairs competitive positions in the township authorities, whereby competing parties and candidates divulged political campaign messages.

5.2 The Key Issues Observed.

5.2.1 Adherence to Election Campaign Program

Observers reported slight noncompliance with election campaign program by campaigning parties and contestants for the grassroots elective political offices. Observers apparently noted and documented some electoral campaign irregularities across the country although majority political parties fairly complied with the campaign meetings opening and closing time.





Pix. 5.2.1/1: Election Campaign Meeting: Residents of Bagara ward, Babati town council in Manyara region at CCM campaign meeting, 26th November 2024.

However, LHRC election observer from Luwilindi Barabarani neighborhood, Rujewa Village, Rujewa Ward (Mbeya region) reported CCM supporters interfered with the CHADEMA scheduled election campaign meeting, which indeed disrupted the latter's campaign meeting plan apart from causing verbal exchanges of inappropriate harsh words.



Pix. 5.2.1/2: Verbal exchanges of inappropriate harsh words: CCM and CHADEMA toughing at Luwilindi Barabarani neighborhood, Rujewa Ward, Mbarali District, Council Mbeya Region, 24th November 2024.



5.2.2 Alleged Unlawful Arrest of Opposition Officials

LHRC observer in Songwe region reported the incident of alleged arrest of the opposition CHADEMA officials accused of crisscrossing election program but were released on bail and ordered to report to police on 29th November 2024. Under the election regulations, issues of alleged transgressing of electoral conducts are treated as election offences, not as criminal offences, henceforth such complaints would be lodged before the district election ethics committee but to the contrary, the state machinery treated the case differently by arresting the candidate or campaigner for an election offence.

5.2.3 Absence of Security Agency

LHRC observation mission noted and documented conspicuous absence of security at the CHADEMA election campaigns meetings held on 25th November 2024 at Mshangano centre in Songea Municipal Council, despite the fact that it is a legal requirement for security agencies to deploy security personnel at election campaign meetings. The same omission was observed in Mbarali district council in Mbeya region.



Pix. 5.2.3/1: CHADEMA Campaign Meeting: Mshangano Centre, Songea Municipal Council, 25th November 2024



5.2.4 Involvement of children in election campaign



Pix. 5.2.4/1: Songea Municipal Council: Contrary to Section 5A of the Political Parties Act and the Election regulations disallowing children to attend election campaign meetings, children were spotted attending CCM meetings



from CCM and CHADEMA, ballot papers at the polling station outnumbered the registered voters thereat.



Pix. 6.2.1/1: Voting Day: Voters at Motomoto hamlet, Utyego village, Ubaruku ward Mbarali district Council, Mbeya region, waiting voting [belated] exercise to commence, 27th November 2024

6.2.2 Prior Marked/Fake Ballot Papers

Vote rigging was established and documented in some parts of the country. Election observers in Kigoma Ujiji Municipal Council saw the already marked ballot papers, an allegation that was confirmed by Returning Officer and Regional Police Commander. An implied conclusion derived from such electoral misnomer and illegality impinges claims and notion that the 2024 local government elections compromised integrity, and therefore, it might not be reflecting true will of Tanzanian voters.

6.2.3 Denial of Polling Agents Access to Polling Stations

According to the election regulations, polling agents are required to take an oath before either a magistrate or a returning officer before being deployed to polling stations. In Iringa Municipal Council, all polling agents from CHADEMA were denied entry to polling stations due to the absence of official stamps on their letters. This action led CHADEMA in Iringa Municipal Council to withdraw from the election process, citing unfair treatment and procedural irregularities.



6.2.4 Absence of Candidates' Photographs on the Ballot Papers

The standard and widely accepted design of ballot papers, both locally and internationally, includes photographs of all respective candidates. This practice enhances voters' confidence and supports their ability to freely and accurately select candidates of their choice, even without relying solely on reading names. However, during the Tanzania Local Government Elections, the ballot papers used nationwide lacked candidates' photographs. This omission significantly contributed to voter confusion and is believed to have led to a high number of invalid ballots. The absence of candidate images was an evident oversight, likely to compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the voting process.

FOMU Na. VI "B"

**KARATASI YA KUPIGIA KURA NAFASI YA MJUMBE WA KAMATI YA MTAA
KUNDI MCHANGANYIKO KWA MGOMBEA PEKEE YA MWAKA 2024**



**HALMASHAURI YA MANISPAA YA IRINGA
KATA YA ILALA
MTAA WA DABODABO**

Na.	JINA LA MGOMBEA	JINA LA CHAMA CHA MGOMBEA	NEMBO YA CHAMA CHA SIASA	WEKA ALAMA YA VEMA KATIKA KISANDUKU CHA NDIYO AU HAPANA (✓)	
1.	ABITIA JOSEPH KASUGA	CHAMA CHA MAPINDUZI (CCM)		NDIYO <input type="checkbox"/>	HAPANA <input type="checkbox"/>
2.	BEATRICE BENEDICT LUPEMBE	CHAMA CHA MAPINDUZI (CCM)		NDIYO <input type="checkbox"/>	HAPANA <input type="checkbox"/>
3.	REHEMA WENDIAKIRI MSANE	CHAMA CHA MAPINDUZI (CCM)		NDIYO <input type="checkbox"/>	HAPANA <input type="checkbox"/>

Pix. 6.2.4/1: Ballot paper: Ballot papers indicated names of candidates and their parties without the pictures of candidates

6.2.5 Suspicious Deaths and Enforced Disappearances of Candidates

Observers reported two incidents of suspicious deaths and enforced disappearances of candidates who vied elections on the CHADEMA flag. In Manyoni Mashariki, Singida region, one CHADEMA candidate was allegedly killed after being assaulted by a prison warder. The



Regional Police Commander for Singida confirmed the incident, and the suspect was allegedly arrested.

In a similar incident, another CHADEMA leader in Tunduma, Songwe region, was reportedly killed during a home invasion. The circumstances surrounding this incident remain unclear. Again, CHADEMA candidate in Nyamagana municipality, Mwanza region, was reported missing and presumed to have been forcibly disappeared.



Pix. 6.2.5/1: Killed: CHADEMA candidates reported killed during local government elections, 2024

6.2.6 Missing Voters' Names and Haphazard Voter Registers

Haphazard voters' registers were the most reported critical incidents of the 2024 local government elections whereby voters could not find their names in the official voter registers upon arriving at their designated polling stations. They were registered as voters in their localities but on election day their respective names vanished in thin air, not found in the official registers.





Pix. 6.2.6/1: Missing voters' names: Citizens at Misunkumilo A primary school polling station, Misunkumilo Ward, Mpanda Municipal Council, Katavi region searching for their names scratching to find their names before voting, 27th November 2024.

In some instances, while voters' names were duly filed and present on the register, they were not arranged chronologically, causing significant delays and confusion for voters as they scratched to find their names. Disorganization and inaccuracy of the voter rolls was almost reported in all the polling stations visited by observation mission in Morogoro municipal council. According to the observation mission report from Morogoro Municipal council, voter names were either missing or improperly displayed which created confusion among voters. Additionally, the names were not arranged alphabetically, further complicating the search process.





Pix. 6.2.6/2: Searching: Police officer assisting voters to search out their names in the register placed on a wall outside a polling station at Karume B polling station located at Karume B street at Mji Mkuu ward, Morogoro Municipal Council, Morogoro region, 27th November 2024.

Dar es Salaam was probably the worst-case scenario whereby in specific areas like it was rampant. Voters at Sinza A polling station, and Geita Town Council in Geita region experienced the agony, although the rough was severally reported by observation missions from all over the country where election observation deployment was executed.

It is the best practice to chronologically arrange voter names in the registers and display the register assiduously at polling stations. Failure to adhere to these practices hindered the smooth conduct of the election and disenfranchised many voters.

6.2.7 Questionable Recognition and Cold Treatment of Election Observers

Despite the critical role that election observers play to give credibility and integrity to elections, there were a lot to be desired by election observers during local government elections. The 2024 Local Government Election Regulations recognize the importance of election observers but that wasn't the case because election observers experienced countless hurdles while on their missions. Clear guidelines to the effect were not in place,



therefore the entire election observation exercise relied heavily and entirely on AROs or RO discretionary powers, individual level of understanding and perceptions.

LHRC was accredited by the President's Office, Regional Administration, and Local Government to observe elections, but such accreditation mattered little amid varying levels of cooperation with and support by RO or AROs across different regions. While in some regions, such as Iringa and Geita observers got relative cordial reception, in other regions like Songwe, it was hard cracking through the obstacles, which hindered the ability of observers to effectively observe elections therein. These varying inconsistencies in treatment and lack of a common approach for handling observers left election observer work bumping.



6.2.8

Intrusion of Government Officials into Management of Election

As election day neared, it became uncommon not to see or hear District Commissioners or Regional Commissioners, acting as chairpersons of corresponding security committees

Pix. 6.2.7/1: Voting Queue: Voters at Rahaleo "A" polling station Mingoyo ward, Lindi Municipal Council waiting to vote, 27th November 2024.

visiting statements or directives and orders to voters, AROs or ROs and other stakeholders



within their jurisdictions. This tendency was preponderant across the country and deviated from the prescribed electoral regulations. Furthermore, these officials were seen conducting media briefings to provide updates on the electoral process, a role that typically falls outside their mandates.

6.2.9 Candidate Names Omitted from Ballot Papers

The act of omission of candidates' names from ballot papers despite official nomination was noted and documented by observers in Iringa Municipal Council, Iringa region, and Ikungi District Council, Singida region. The candidates affected by those omissions were notably opposition contenders, particularly from CHADEMA, who earlier on had been confirmed by AROs as official candidates. The affected candidates respective names seemed to have been obliterated from the ballot papers on voting day. When observers sought clarification on the anomaly, the explanation was such that the names were erroneously omitted. The explanations weren't satisfactory because no one was held responsible to the effect, especially when such ostensible error only affected the opposition candidates although jeopardized the entire election integrity.



Pix. 6.2.9/1: Voting on Course: Motomoto hamlet voters, Utyego village, Ubaruku ward Mbarali district council in Mbeya region lined up to vote. Alas, the name of candidate sponsored by CHADEMA was omitted from the ballot paper on voting day



Election observers reported the same anomaly in Mbarali district council Mbeya region at Motomoto polling station, Utyego village, Ubaruku ward where one of the candidates contesting for hamlet chair position on CHADEMA ticket had his name omitted from ballot paper on the voting day with ARO giving unsatisfactory excuses while voters were forced to vote for only CCM candidate.

6.2.10 Erroneous Ballot Papers Design

Almost in the majority of polling stations visited by election observer missions it was established that errors in the ballot design were preponderant. The observers in Ikungi district council, Singida region report that the names of CUF candidates appeared wrongly matched with CHADEMA logos and vice versa. Women candidates for special seats to village governing councils also suffered the similar mismatches with their names listed under CHADEMA but matched with CCM logos. Fresh ballot papers were eventually delivered, but no clear guidance was provided regarding the treatment of votes cast before the discrepancies were rectified. Honestly, these anomalies were almost reported in many polling stations visited by LHRC election observer team missions.

6.2.11 Delayed Voting Operation

Delay or cancellation of voting operation was frequently reported as documented by observers with a number of reasons given, including but not limited to delayed delivery of ballot papers. It is on record that voting in the entire Kilosa district council was cancelled and rescheduled for the next day, 28th November 2024. It was further revealed that the reason for delay of ballot papers in Kilosa district council was essentially mismatch of voters names and the voters register and haphazard placement of voters' names. The same anomaly was reported in Kilombero district council at Mbasa ward in Morogoro region where voting stopped for about one hour waiting for the ballot papers.





Pix. 6.2.11/1: Waiting the ballot papers: Voters at Mkombwe B polling station, Mkombwe Village, Ubaruku Ward in Mbarali district council Mbeya region waiting delivery of ballot papers before commencing to vote, 27th November 2024.

Again, due to belated delivery of ballot papers at Mkombwe B polling station, Mkombwe village, Ubaruku ward in Mbarali district council, Mbeya region voting was delayed thereat. Voting delay was also experienced at Mtakuja hamlet, Ikungi Village, Ikungi Ward, in Ikungi district council, Singida region because the ballot papers for hamlet chairperson vote were belatedly delivered, nearly at 9:30 AM. In Kiruma hamlet, Ulyampiti Village, Unyahati Ward, in Ikungi district council Singida region the ballot papers for the hamlet chair position could not be delivered until 10:00 AM. These delays caused temporary disruptions, although voting proceeded once materials were in place, definitely contrary to what is enshrined in the regulations.

6.2.12 Unguaranteed Right to Secrecy of Casting Vote

Secrecy of vote stands as one of the core principles of voting in electoral democracy that aligns well with key democratic rights. Voting requires exercising the right to privacy when casting vote, but observers reported on several occasions of how design of several polling stations compromised voters' right to privacy while casting vote – sheer violation of the right to privacy.





Pix. 6.2.12/1: Violation of right to secrecy of vote: Voters at Kituo cha Malori polling station in Majengo Ward, Mpanda municipal council in Katavi region waiting in a queue to cast their votes where the right to privacy is not protected, 27th November 2024.

It was reported in Mpanda municipal council, Katavi region that polling stations were designated in a way that the right to secrecy of vote was not protected. This anomaly was also reported almost in all the areas where LHRC deployed election observers.



Pix. 6.2.12/2: Unprotected secrecy of vote: State of a polling station at Masika open space located in Mango Street in Kingo ward, Morogoro municipal council, Morogoro region, 27th November 2024



Election observers in Mtwara municipal council a polling station at Magomeni, Tandika ward in Mtwara municipal council had no booth of any kind but rather, voters voted on open place desk.

Election observers in Tarime district council, Mara region, further reported voting taking place in a strange group mode whereby voters were instructed on whom to vote and therefore guided accordingly. Election observers' reports qualified the incident as typical practice in several polling stations across the country where election observer mission deployments were executed. Group voting is synonymous to corruption in the electoral process and breaches the principle of secrecy of vote.

Pix. 6.2.12/3: Open space voting: Voters casting votes on a desk designated as a polling station at Magomeni A in Mtwara municipal council, 27th November 2024.





Pix. 6.2.12/4: Ramshackle polling stations: A polling station at Muhimbili neighborhood in Rasbura ward, Lindi Municipal council in Lindi region, 27th November 2024.

The election observer mission in Lindi municipal council reported ramshackle polling stations in the areas they visited, which below standard. Given such kind of voting stations voters confidence in voting, and therefore the secrecy of vote could not be guaranteed. In the unusual events, at many polling stations, voting operation took place under tree canopies. One such incident was reported to have taken place in Msuna hamlet, Mukinya Village, Dung'unyi Ward, Ikungi district council in Singida region where a proper polling station could not be set up. Secrecy of vote could not be granted under such shaky voting arrangements, which certainly affected the integrity of the election results.

6.2.13 Allegations of Involving Underage Voters

The United Republic of Tanzania Constitution (1977), election laws and corresponding regulations forbid citizen voting before the age of 18 years.⁴² In many places allegations of involving underage in the election process were levelled in many places whereby primary and secondary schools students were spotted during voter registration and voting all done in coordinated fashion involving AROs. According to election observers' reports, close

⁴² Article 5(3), election regulations 2024.



examination of those young voters revealed, although voted, they were under the age of 18 years.



Pix. 6.2.13/1: Underage voters: Students at Ikungi secondary school polling station queuing to poll at Misri hamlet, Ikungi village, Ikungi Ward, Ikungi district council in Singida region, 27th November 2024.

Observers noticed and documented voting queues with suspected underage students at Misri polling station, Ikungi village, Ikungi district council in Singida region, Mbarali district council polling stations in Mbeya region, Songea municipal council polling stations and at polling stations in many other visited regions.

6.2.14 Consideration of people with special needs

Save for some few areas where consideration of people with special needs was not deemed as priority, in many polling stations targeted by election observers, people with special needs were considered according to what is enshrined in the election regulations. Consideration of people with special needs constitutes part of the acceptable election best practices.





Pix. 6.2.14/1: Special needs voters: Voters in a queue while elderly and PWDs seated waiting their turn to cast votes, 27th November 2024

6.2.15 Allowing Not in the Register to Vote

Prior voter registration is a mandatory requirement for citizens to exercise voting right/vote. To the contrary, however, election observers took note and documented unregistered voters in especially Dodoma municipal and Serengeti district council Mara region being permitted to vote knowingly their names were not in the voters' registers. In many occasions voters were initially allowed to vote before crosschecking if their names were documented the voter registers. Crosschecking of names would be done after a voter had already voted. The extent and magnitude of such illegality and un-procedural practices may perhaps be considered to have rendered the 2024 local government elections a farce.

6.2.16 Delays to Place Voters' Lists on Polling Stations Walls

The election observers took note and reported about the voting environment faced with significant challenges, including, on many occasions, AROs delaying to place lists of registered voters on the polling stations' walls. The delays disrupted the voting procedure, leading to confusion and disorganization among voters and polling staff. As a result, long queues were formed, causing frustration and discomfort for many, particularly the special groups such as lactating mothers and the elderly voters. The extended waiting times made it difficult to individual voters to exercise their constitutional obligation as enshrined under



article 5 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of which in one way or another affected credibility of the elections.

Election observers reported those delays to have happened in Mbarali district council and Mbeya city council in Mbeya region, Dar es Salaam region and Morogoro in Kilosa district council.



Pix. 6.2.16/1: Voting Day: voters queueing to wait casting votes at Ndanyela neighborhood, in Nzovwe ward, Mbeya city council in Mbeya region, 27th November 2024

The logistical setback as noted by observers informed the need for improved planning and execution of electoral operations to ensure a smooth voting process that accommodates all voters fairly. Moreover, Inadequate arrangements to accommodate visually impaired or no-formal education voters contributed to delays and tensions.

6.2.17 Candidates Assuming Roles as Polling Agents

The election regulations 2024 notably guide placement and administration of parties/candidates' polling agents. However, whether a candidate would assume or step into the choice of a polling stations created uncertainty because the regulations clearly state



political parties may deploy polling agents as may be required during electoral process. Election observers throughout the country reported at some polling stations where candidates assumed the role of their own polling agents, which crisscrossed election regulations.

The election regulations clearly provides that a candidate can assume role of a polling agent at the time of votes counting. Election observers in Arusha, Ruvuma (Songea municipal council) and Mbeya (Mbarali district council) reported disputes involving AROs and CHADEMA officials whereby CHADEMA had deployed their candidates as polling agents contrary to election regulations. The dispute was later dissolved, the candidates rescinded polling agents' roles, the polling agents were deployed instead.

6.2.18 Utilizing Public Resources for Political Campaigns

Ethical election campaign practices disallow political parties and candidates using public resources to facilitate election campaigns. Parties, candidates and election campaigners are encouraged to use own resources while campaigning for the purpose of avoiding conflict of interest, corruption and taking unduly advantages among candidates, especially those public service officials.



Pix. 6.2.18/1: Utilization of public resources: The government vehicle at one of CCM campaigns parked at Kipumbiko village, Puma Ward, Ikungi District Council in Singida region.



Reports from observation missions narrate the spotted incidents of utilizing public resources such as motor vehicles during election campaigns, which is contrary to election guidelines and ethical practices. The report from Ikungi district council in Singida region laid bare the use of government motor vehicles in the campaign period by especially candidates flagging the ruling party – sheer disregard of election regulations and election ethical practices. In high level election campaign analysis would reveal using public resources to benefit incumbent opponent as amounting to corruption in the electoral process.

6.2.19 Declaration of Official Election Results – Countrywide

Immediately after the 27th November elections were concluded, PO-RALG, the body mandated to manage the local government elections declared the official results as summarized in the table below.

Table 6.2.19/1: Summary of Countrywide Official Election Results

s/n	Contested Position	Name of Party	Numerical gain	Percentage
1.	Village chairperson (available slots: 12271)	CCM	12,150	99.01%
2.		CHADEMA	97	0,79%
3.		ACT-Wazalendo	11	0.09%
4.		CUF	10	0.08%
5.		NCCR-Mageuzi	1	0.008%
6.		UMD	1	0.008%
7.		ADC	1	0.008%
1.	Neighborhood chairperson (available slots: 4264)	CCM	4213	98.83%
2.		CHADEMA	36	0.84%
3.		ACT-Wazalendo	9	0.21%
4.		CUF	4	0.09%
5.		CHAUMA	1	0,02%
1.	Hamlet chairperson (available slots: 63849)	CCM	62728	98.26%
2.		CHADEMA	853	1.34%
3.		ACT-Wazalendo	150	0.28%
4.		CUF	78	0.12%
5.		NCCR-Mageuzi	10	0.02%
6.		UDP	6	0.01%
7.		UMD	2	0.003%
8.		ADC	1	0.002%
1	Village governing council members	CCM	202,975	99%
2.		CHADEMA	1,222	0.53%



3.		ACT-Wazalendo	232	0.1%
4.		CUF	105	0.05%
5.		NCCR—Mageuzi	16	0.01%
6.		Demokrasia Makini	3	0.001%
7.		NLD	1	0.0005%
8.		ADC	1	0.0005%
	Neighborhood committee members	CCM	21,148	99.30%
1		CHADEMA	101	0.47%
2.		ACT-Wazalendo	29	0.14%
3.		CUF	16	0.08%
4.		NCCR-Mageuzi	2	0.01%
5.		CCK	1	
6.		ADC	1	

Source: [The Chanzo](#)

6.3 Post Election Segment of Election Cycle

The election regulations provide guidance on post elections phase whereby series of events would be expected to follow, including but not limited to displaying election results on public notice boards.





Pix. 6.3/1: Post elections phase: Election results published on the public notice boards pursuant to successful vote counting and results announcing at polling stations in Ikungi district council Singida region, 27th November 2024

The observer mission reports from places of deployment narrate that AROs complied well with the requirement of public display of election results on the polling stations notice boards. However, there were few polling stations where AROs did not display election results on the public notice boards, which contradicted the election regulations.

6.3.1 Security Concerns Engulfing Elected Leaders

Post-election actions in some electoral neighborhoods, villages and hamlets posed insecurity threat against leaders-elect. Incidents of intimidations via messages threatening life of elected leaders were reported in the Njombe town council where unknown people threatened leaders elect not to access or appear in the public offices to which they were elected to serve on the ground of unfair election grudges.

6.3.2 Suspension of pupils on allegations of parents supporting the opposition

Perhaps the most amusing post-election freak documented by election observer was an unexpected incident that took place in Nyasa district council, Rukwa region, whereby a



primary school head teacher, out of own political obsession and postelection anguish he suspended some pupils alleging their parents supported a candidate from the opposition – CHADEMA. As the incident caught the media attention and therefore the public, the head teacher was reprimanded by the ministry of education, and the victimized pupils were readmitted to school.

Certainly, the head teacher’s reaction abrogated article 3 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, which spells out clearly that Tanzania is a multiparty democracy, whereas article 20 provides for citizens’ right and freedom to join political parties of ones choices.

6.4 Disputes Resolution Mechanism

1 There was expectation from the public, political and legal pundits that the district courts of law would overflow with election petitions following elections contenders’ dissatisfaction, disputing election results. Apparently that several election petitions by aggrieved candidates would be opened under article 13(6)(a) and 107A of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977. The expectation didn’t seem to materialize furthering a call for political research to the effect.

6.4.1 Pre-Election Dispute Resolution Machineries

During voter registration and after lists of registered voters’ names were displayed placed on public notice boards, any interested or aggrieved voter might lodge an objection before the ARO against fellow voters during and before expiry of prescribed period for inspecting voters registers. Once the objection was lodged the ARO would within two days determine the objection. In case the ARO was satisfied with the objection s/he would remove the name of the purported voter from the voters register.

In case the affected (removed) voter is also aggrieved by the decision of the ARO, s/he should lodge appeal within two days to the RO who should determine the appeal within 4 days from the date the appeal was lodged.



6.4.2 Post Election Dispute Resolution Machineries

Under Regulation 44 of the Elections for Village Chairpersons, Members of the Village Governing Council, and Hamlet Chairpersons Regulations (GN No. 573 of 12th July 2024), a candidate aggrieved by the election results may lodge an election petition before the District Court within 30 days from the date the election results are declared. Similar provisions are reflected in Regulation 44 of GN No. 571 of 12th July 2024 (governing elections for Village Chairpersons, Members of Village Councils, and Hamlet Chairpersons), Regulation 41 of GN No. 572 (elections for Hamlet Chairpersons in Township Authorities), and Regulation 43 of GN No. 574 (elections of Neighborhood Chairpersons and Members of Neighborhood Committees).

A notable gap in these provisions, however, is the lack of clarity on the modality of filing such complaints whether they are to be lodged strictly as formal petitions or through other permissible means. Nonetheless, one commendable aspect of the current framework is the absence of a mandatory requirement to deposit security for costs, which contrasts with procedures under general elections where such deposits are obligatory.

It is worth noting that ACT Wazalendo, one of the major political parties, reportedly filed a total of 51 election petitions across the country, signaling a significant level of dissatisfaction with the conduct and outcomes of the local government elections.⁴³

⁴³ <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-s-act-wazalendo-files-51-lawsuits-over-local-election-results-4880282>



CHAPTER SEVEN

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter intends to translate and use as leverage, the key issues emanating from the chapters molding and covered in the report, into recommendations as way of informing the relevant stakeholders, authorities, the general public but particularly the election management body to consider improving management of future elections. The recommendations are based on data, information and experience gathered from the voter's education program conducted by LHRC from 1st of October 2024 to 26th November 2024 and the election intelligence gathered by election observer missions that LHRC deployed in fifteen regions across Tanzania Mainland, i.e. Kagera, Njombe, Singida, Geita, Simiyu, Lindi, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mbeya, Katavi, Iringa, Mara, Ruvuma, Manyara, and Songwe.

7.2 Legal Framework Governing Tanzania Local Government Elections

Tanzania local government elections experience the gap of lacking finite and coordinated legal framework, which certainly affected management of the 2024 elections. Neither do the electoral support instruments and mechanisms to facilitate stakeholders exist for media and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) independently provide voter education and/or conduct election observation; formalized and existing as reliable system rather than service providers relying on discretionary powers of local government officials. A partnership role and cooperation principles compact is loudly recommended.

7.3 Recommendations

The recommendations crafted and resonating with substantive issues covered and documented in the preceding chapters constituting the report are as narrated hereunder:



- xiv. A coordinated legal framework be established whereby procedures for conducting the local government election swiveled well with election stakeholders support instruments is clearly outlined.
- xv. Registration of local government elections be merged with that of the INEC where the registration shall be biometric as opposed to the current situation where the registration process is symbolically an *ad-hoc* exercise.
- xvi. A legislation mandating INEC to coordinate and supervise local government elections as per section 10(c)(1) of the INEC Act be enacted.
- xvii. A clear post-election dispute settlement mechanism is established as opposed to the current system which seems to have a number of challenges as enshrined in the regulation
- xviii. Introduce the election management governance system whereby government officials should phase out from directly supervising and coordinating local government elections, but the latter is managed by an independent election management body.
- xix. Establish a portal whereby NGOs applying for accreditation to provide voter education or conduct election observation shall lodge applications unlike the current arrangement whereby discretionary powers of government officials prevail.
- xx. The application for and accreditation process of NGOs desirous to provide voter education or conduct election observation must be thoroughly transparent.
- xxi. Extend the period for providing voter education to 30 days before the election.
- xxii. Afford an opportunity to stakeholders aggrieved by the decision of the permanent secretary to grant accreditation to appeal.
- xxiii. Grounds for disqualification of candidates should be only limited to constitutional requirements.
- xxiv. Polling agents to be a mandatory requirement both in voting and counting results. Failure to deploy polling agents to invalidate the electoral process.



- xxv. Accreditation of election observers to be granted according to the wishes of the applicant and not the authority issuing the accreditation
- xxvi. Polling agents to take oath to any commissioner of oath not mandatorily necessary to the returning officer or a magistrate

